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Abstract 
Recently,  due  to  widespread  use  of  Radio  Frequency 
IDentification (RFID) systems in personal applications, security 
and privacy of these systems have got more attention. In order to 
provide  security  and  privacy  of  RFID  users,  different 
authentication  protocols  have  been  proposed.  In  2014, 
Mohammadi et al. proposed an improved authentication protocol 
for  RFID  systems.  They  claimed  that  their  protocol  is  secure 
against various attacks. In this study, we investigate security and 
privacy of their protocol. It is shown that their protocol is not 
safe against several attacks including secret parameters reveal, 
tag impersonation, data integrity, desynchronization and also it 
cannot  provide  user  privacy.  Then,  in  order  to  omit 
aforementioned  weaknesses,  we  apply  some  changes  on 
Mohammadi  et  al.’s  protocol  and  we  propose  an  improved 
protocol. In addition, the security and privacy of the proposed 
protocol are analyzed against various attacks. 
 
Keywords:  RFID  Authentication  Protocol,  EPC  C1  G2 
Standard, Security and Privacy, Attack. 
1.  Introduction 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems allow us 
to  identify  subjects  or  objects  without  physical  contact. 
Recently this technology have been utilized in almost all 
identification  and  authentication  applications  [1]-  [2]. 
Generally, a RFID system consists of three main parts that 
are including tag, reader and back-end server. A tag is a 
small  electronic  chip  that  uses  a  microstrip  antenna  to 
make wireless connection with a reader. According to the 
power and memory of tags, they classify to the different 
classes. Based on supply power, the tags divided to the  
 
three categories. Some of the tags have a buttery that use it 
for  internal  processing  and  wireless  communications. 
These type of tags called active tags. The next class of tags 
is passive tags that do not have their own battery and use 
reader’s  electrical  field  to  supply  their  needed  power. 
Communication distance of these tags is relatively short, 
i.e., 80-100 cm in the best case [3]. The last class is semi-
passive tags and their capabilities are between active and 
passive tags. This kind of tags have a buttery but they use 
this  battery  just  for  internal  processing  and  for  wireless 
communications  act  like  a  passive  tag  and  generate 
required power using reader’s electrical field [4]. Beside 
mentioned applications, RFID tags and readers will play 
prominent role in the Internet of Things (IoT) and Internet 
of Device (IoD) systems that are the next generation of 
internet [5]. In IoT and IoD systems, all existing objects in 
our environment will connect to each other and will share 
information  with  other  objects  or  subjects  [5].  These 
connections  can  be  made  by  RFID  tags,  GPS  or  any 
sensing device.  
A system model of a RFID system is shown in Fig. 1 [6]. 
It can be seen that each reader located between the tags 
and the back-end server and can exchange data between 
them.  In  some  applications  there  are  several  tags  (e.g., 
physical access control in a company) in deployed system 
model. But in some RFID systems there are lots of tags 
(e.g., books in library or shopping centers) that can have a 
big  influence  on  the  authentication  performances.  The 
third  and  the  main  part  of  each  RFID  system  model  is 
database.  The  database  contains  all  secret  information 
about  tags  and  it  uses  them  on  tags  authentication  and 
identification processes.  
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Due to nature of  wireless communication, each  wireless 
communication in insecure channel can be eavesdropped 
by an illegal person. In each RFID system there are two 
communication channels between the tag, the reader and 
the database. The communication channel between the tag 
and the reader is insecure and can be eavesdropped by an 
adversary.  But  in  some  cases  communication  channel 
between the reader and the database is secure.  
In  the  recent  years,  due  to  widespread  use  of  RFID 
systems  in  different  applications,  the  security  and  the 
privacy of end-users have become very important. In order 
to  protect  security  and  privacy  of  RFID  users,  different 
authentication  protocols  have  been  proposed  [7]  -  [13]. 
Although, all the designed protocols have been proposed 
to provide secure communications for RFID systems and 
keep  safe  their  privacy,  it  is  showed  that  most  of  the 
proposed protocols are vulnerable against various attacks 
and need more challenging to optimize their security [7], 
[14]- [15]. 
In the last few years, EPC Class 1 Generation 2 (EPC C1 
G2) is one of the most challenging RFID standards that 
proposed  by  EPCGlobal  [16].  Some  protocols  that  are 
based on EPC C1 G2 standards and proposed recently are 
reported in [7], [14] - [15], [17] - [18].  
In  2010,  Yeh  et  al.  proposed  a  RFID  mutual 
authentication  protocol  for  RFID  systems  that  is 
accordance to the EPC C1 G2 standard [19]. They claimed 
that  their  protocol  can  provide  security  and  privacy  of 
RFID users. In 2011, Habibi et al. [8] showed that still Yeh 
et al.’s protocol is vulnerable against some security and 
privacy attacks and cannot provide secure communication. 
Then, they applied some changes on Yeh et al.’s protocol 
and proposed an improved version. In 2014, Mohammadi 
et al. [13] analyzed the security and the privacy of Habibi 
et al.’s protocol and showed that their protocol has some 
security  problems  and  suffers  from  secret  parameters 
reveal,  tag  impersonation  attack,  data  desynchronization 
attack  and  traceability  attack.  Then,  Mohammadi  et  al. 
revised Habibi et al.’s protocol and proposed an improved 
lightweight  mutual  authentication  protocol  (ILMAP)  for 
RFID systems. They analyzed the security and the privacy 
of the ILMAP protocol and claimed that with new changes 
all weaknesses of Habibi et al.’s protocol are omitted and 
the improved protocol is resistant against different threats.  
In  this  study,  we  investigate  the  security  and  the 
privacy of the ILMAP protocol. It is shown that ILMAP 
protocol is vulnerable against some attacks and it cannot 
provide  secure  communication  for  RFID  users.  More 
precisely, it is shown that ILMAP protocol suffers from 
secret  parameters  reveal,  data  integrity,  reader  forward 
compromise,  traceability  attack,  backward  traceability 
attack  and  forward  traceability  attack.  Then,  in  order  to 
increase the security and the privacy of ILMAP protocol, 
we  change  some  processes  of  ILMAP  protocol  and 
proposed a strengthened version of it. Then, we investigate 
resistance  of  the  improved  protocol  against  different 
attacks. Security analysis show that the improved protocol 
removes all existing weaknesses of ILMAP protocol and 
also it is secure against different attacks.  
The  structure  of  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  the 
ILMAP protocol is introduced in section 2. In section 3, 
we investigate vulnerabilities of the ILMAP protocol. In 
section  4,  an  improved  version  of  the  ILMAP  protocol 
presented.  The  security  and  privacy  of  the  proposed 
protocol  are  analyzed  in  section  5,  also  in  this  section 
analysis of the proposed protocol are compared with some 
similar protocols that are in the accordance with EPC C1 
G2 standard and proposed recently. Finally, we conclude 
this paper in section 6. 
2.  The ILMAP Protocol  
The  ILMAP  protocol  is  a  RFID  mutual  authentication 
protocol conforming to EPC C1 G2 standard that proposed 
by Mohamadi et al. in [13]. The structure of protocol and 
authentication  procedure  are  shown  in  Fig.  2.  As  it 
mentioned above, this protocol is based on EPC C1 G2 
standard and uses         and      to protect exchanged 
messages. Table 1 shows the notations that are used in the 
ILMAP  protocol.  In  the  ILMAP  protocol,  all 
communication channels between the tag, the reader and 
the back-end server are insecure and can be eavesdropped 
by an adversary. 
Table 1. The Notations of ILMAP protocol 
Not.  Description 
      Request message  
      Electronic Product Code (EPC) of the  th tag  
    Product information of the  th tag 
    The authentication key shared by back-end server 
and tag  
    The communications key shared by back-end 
server and tag 
      The pseudonym identification code of the  th tag  
      The pseudonym identification code of  th reader 
 
 
Fig. 1. A System model of RFID systems [6]. 
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    A random number  
      Hash function 
         Pseudo random number generator 
      For second run of protocol 
   Concatenation operation   
       Message A is XORed with message B 
       
     Compare whether A is equal to B or not 
 
3.  Vulnerabilities of ILMAP Protocol 
This section aims to analyze the security and the privacy 
of ILMAP protocol. It is shown that the security and the 
privacy  of  ILMAP  have  some  problems  that  makes  it 
vulnerable  against  some  security  attacks  also  it  cannot 
provide user privacy. For privacy analysis, we use a formal 
privacy model that proposed by Ouafi and Phan in [4]. 
3.1  Security Analysis 
In  this  subsection,  the  security  of  ILMAP  protocol  is 
analyzed. It is shown that it has some security problems 
that  make  it  vulnerable  against  secret  parameter  reveal, 
DATA integrity and reader forward secrecy compromise. 
Security analysis are given in the rest of subsection with 
more details. 
3.1.1  Secret parameter reveal 
In the designing of the RFID authentication protocols, it is 
very  important  that  the  secret  parameters  be  safe  in 
communications  and  an  attacker  could  not  obtain  them. 
Here  we  present  a  practical  attack  on  ILMAP  protocol 
which shows that an attacker is able to reveal all secret 
 
Fig. 2. The ILMAP protocol. 
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parameters               .  This  attack  consists  of  two 
phases as follows, 
Learning  phase:  First,  the  attacker  acts  as  an 
eavesdropper. After one successful run, he/she saves the 
exchanged  data  between  the  target  tag  and  the  reader 
including     ,                                 , 
            ,                                    , 
                         . 
Attack phase: In the next session, when the target tag 
responds  to  the  reader,  the  attacker  eavesdrops      and 
aborts the rest of protocol. Then, the attacker uses      and 
eavesdropped messages and performs following steps, 
a)  Since      is  a  16-bit  string,  thus          where 
    {            }. Now, using the obtained    
in the learning phase, 
                                 
                                     
                                      (       )        
                                        
                    
Now, using the obtained    and eavesdropped   in 
learning phase, the value of    can be calculated as 
follows,   
            
b)  Since  the  length  of      is  16-bit,  thus          
where     {            }. Now using    and    
that are obtained in the first step and messages    
and    that eavesdropped in the learning phase, the 
attacker can perform following operations, 
                                 
                                
                                                          
                                       
                   
c)  Now via      and   , the secret value of    can be 
computed as follows, 
                          
It can be seen that in this attack the attacker needs one 
session eavesdropping and         PRNG computations. It 
is worth to mention that after performing this attack and 
obtaining  all  secret  values  of  the  tag,  the  attacker  can 
perform  lots  of  attacks  including  traceability  attack,  tag 
impersonation  attack,  reader  impersonation  attack,  and 
desynchronization  attack  with  the  success  probability  of 
“1”. Furthermore, the ILMAP protocol has some another 
weaknesses that in the rest of paper some of the possible 
attacks are given. 
3.1.2   DATA integrity problem 
In  the  ILMAP  protocol       is  used  to  protect  the 
transmission  of      between  the  back-end  server  and 
the  reader.  Due  to  structure  of                    , 
Mohammadi et al. claimed that an attacker cannot forge 
the transmission      between the back-end server and 
the  reader.  However,  it  is  shown  that  ILMAP  protocol 
cannot protect the integrity of     . This attack can be 
expressed as follows, 
a)  When the back-end server sends    and      to the 
reader, the attacker intercepts them. 
b)  The  attacker  calculates  a  forged  value          
        , where   is a random value that generated 
by the attacker, and then forwards    and         to 
the reader. 
c)  Upon receiving    and        , the reader retrieves 
    and in order to obtain         , the reader 
XORs calculated     with the received         and 
forwards    to the tag. 
As  it  can  be  seen  the  XORed  result          is  not 
equal to the original value of      which generated in the 
back-end server. As a result, the stored      in the reader 
is not correct but the reader believes that is original     . 
  Note that, since the attacker did not change   , 
the tag did not recognize this forgery attack. Therefore, the 
ILMAP protocol has      integrity problem. 
3.1.3   Reader Forward Secrecy Compromise 
In forward secrecy, if a secret value of the reader will be 
compromised  by  an  attacker,  the  attacker  should  not  be 
able to perform traceability attacks and trace the location 
of victim reader in the different rounds. Here now, it is 
shown  that  ILMAP  protocol  cannot  preserve  reader 
forward secrecy. To this aim, the attacker obtains    by 
eavesdropping  exchanged  messages  in  one  session  of 
protocol.  After  that,  the  attacker  obtains       by 
compromising  the  victim  reader  and  verifies        
         
    to  trace  the  victim  reader.  As  a  result,  ILMAP 
protocol  is  not  secure  against  reader  forward  secrecy 
attack. 
3.2  Privacy Analysis   
Beside mentioned weaknesses, the ILMAP protocol cannot 
provide user privacy and it is vulnerable against backward 
traceability,  traceability  and  forward  traceability  attacks. 
In  the  recent  years,  in  order  to  study  and  analyze  the 
privacy  of  RFID  authentication  privacy  different  formal 
methods as a formal privacy model have been proposed 
[4], [20], [21], [22]. In [4], Ouafi and Phan presented a 
privacy model to evaluate RFID protocols. In Ouafi and 
Phan privacy model, the attacker’s abilities are classified 
in  four  different  categories  including                , 
             ,             and             .  In  each 
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query, the attacker has different abilities that are reported 
in [4] with more details. In this section, we analyze the 
privacy of ILMAP protocol and present our privacy attacks 
based on Ouafi and Phan privacy model.  
3.2.1  Traceability Attack 
Privacy  concern  is  one  of  the  most  important  issues  in 
designing of the RFID authentication protocols. In the rest 
of this  subsection  we show  that ILMAP protocol is not 
safe against traceability attack and an attacker can trace the 
location of a specific tag. To this aim, the attacker acts as 
following,  
Learning  phase:  In  th  round,  the  attacker   sends  an 
                      by sending    and obtains   
  . 
Challenge phase: The attacker   choses two fresh tags    
and     for  test,  and  sends  a                        . 
According to the bit     {   } that chosen randomly, the 
attacker is given a tag      {     }. Next, the attacker   
sends an                           by sending   , and 
it obtains     
   .  
Guess  phase:  The  attacker    stops  the  game  G,  and 
outputs a bit      {   } as a guess of bit   as follows,  
     {                
       
         
                              
                   (1) 
As a result, it can be written: 
     
           |                                 | 
                         |            
 
 |   |   
 
 |  
 
      
Proof: According to the ILMAP protocol in Fig. 2, it can 
be  seen  that  since  the  tag    does  not  update  its  secret 
value  and  uses  the  same     in  the  both  Learning  and 
Challenge  phases,  the  attacker  can  perform  traceability 
attacks and track the target tag.  
3.2.2  Forward Traceability Attack 
This subsection aims to show that ILMAP protocol suffers 
from forward traceability attack. In the ILMAP protocol the 
     is fixed in all rounds and it does not change in the 
next run. It can be shown that an attacker can use this fact 
and perform forward traceability attack as follows.  
Learning phase: In the  th round, the attacker   sends a 
                      and  obtains     
     
         
    
from tag   . It also sends an                       and 
obtains       . Now the attacker can compute      at the 
session       by   times  repeating      of    for      . 
Therefore,  if  we  have      ,         can  be  obtained  by 
XORing      and      as                     .  
Challenge phase: The attacker   choses two new tags    
and     for  the  test,  and  sends  a                     . 
According to the bit     {   } that chosen randomly, the 
attacker is given a tag      {     }. After that, in round 
         , the attacker sends an                       
   by sending      (i.e., the same value of session  ) and 
obtains (      
        
   ).  
Guess  phase:  The  attacker    stops  the  game  G,  and 
outputs  a  bit      {   } as  a  guess  of  bit  .  In  order  to 
guess     ,  firstly  the  attacker  computes 
          (    (  
  )) ,          
       and     
    (      
         ), where   is a 16-bit string. Then, 
outputs  a  bit  
    {    } as  a  guess  of  bit    using  the 
following rule, 
     {                 
            
                                 
                        (2) 
As a result, it can be written that, 
     
           |                                 | 
                    
  |            
 
 |   |   
 
 |  
 
      
Proof: Since the value of     
  is fixed in all rounds, thus 
      
             
   . Using this fact, the following equations 
can be written.  
                   
       
          (    (  
  )) 
                 (    (  
  )) 
                
       
                  
          
         
         
    
                     
           
           
      
         
         (        
           
           
   ) 
                (      
             ) 
                                                                            (3) 
3.2.3  Backward Traceability Attack   
Beside mentioned traceability concerns, it can be shown 
that  ILMAP  protocol  does  not  assure  the  backward 
untraceability  attack.  In  updating  of  ILMAP  protocol,  it 
can  be  seen  that      is       of      .  In  the  rest  of 
subsection, we showe that an attacker can use this issue 
and obtain      with     computations. 
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Learning phase: In the  th round, the attacker   sends a 
                     and  obtains   
   and       
   from 
tag   .Now, since    is a 16-bit string, thus        where 
    {            }. Now, 
                                 
                                     
                             
         (  )        
                                        
     
                    
It can be seen that the value of     
    can be obtained after 
maximum     computations. 
Challenge phase: The attacker   selects two fresh tags    
and      for  test,  and  sends  a                       . 
According  to  the  randomly  chosen  bit      {   } ,  the 
attacker is given a tag      {     }. After that, in round 
       th, the attacker sends an                          , 
and obtains     
   ,     
   ,     
    and       
   . Then, the attacker 
computes           
          
    and          (      
    
 )                 (    
         
   ). 
Guess  phase:  The  attacker    stops  the  game  G,  and 
outputs  a  bit      {   } as  a  guess  of  bit  .  In  order  to 
determine  
    {    }, the attacker uses the following rule, 
     {                 
         
       
                                      
                      (4) 
As a result, it can be written: 
     
           |                                 | 
                             |            
 
 |   |   
 
   | 
                             |(   
 
   )  
 
 |  
 
             
Proof: In the updating procedure of ILMAP protocol we 
see  that    
         (    
   ) .  With  assuming  this  fact 
following equations can be written,  
            
        (      
      )          
      (    
         
   ) 
      (      
         
          
   )
      (    
          
   )
      (    
         
   ) 
      (      
           
    )       (      
   )
      (    
         
   ) 
      (        
           
    )       (      
   )
      (    
         
   ) 
        
         
                                                                 (5) 
It is worth to mention that     
   is fixed in all rounds, so 
      
             
   . 
4.  Improved Version of ILMAP Protocol 
In section 3, it is shown that ILMAP protocol has some 
weaknesses  that  due  to  these  weaknesses  this  protocol 
suffers from secret parameters reveal, data integrity attack 
and reader forward secrecy compromise, also it is not safe 
against privacy threats. In this section, we aim to propose a 
strengthened version of the ILMAP protocol that removes 
all existing weaknesses. In the proposed protocol we apply 
some changes on updating, authentication and responses 
messages  that  increase  the  security  and  privacy  of  the 
proposed  protocol  and  make  it  secure  against  different 
attacks. The new changes can be expressed as follows,  
  In  the  ILMAP  protocol  the  value  of     is  equal  to 
                                   that  in  the 
proposed  protocol  we  change  it  to  the          
                        . 
  In the ILMAP protocol, in each run, the tag sends    
directly  to  the  reader.  In  the  proposed  protocol,  we 
changed  this  message  and  the  tag  does  not  send    
directly to the reader. Instead it sends              to 
the reader, where    is a random number that generate 
by the tag in each run of protocol. 
  In the new protocol, also we change reader to the back-
end server response. In the ILMAP protocol, the reader 
responses  to  the  back-end  server  with     
            that in the proposed protocol we change 
it to the                    . 
  The next change is in the back-end server responses. In 
ILMAP protocol, the back-end server responses to the 
reader with       and   . In the proposed protocol, we 
define a new message                    that the 
back-end  server  sends  it  to  the  reader  together  with 
     and   .  
  Moreover, we modify updating of ILMAP as follows,  
                            
                                               
                                           . 
The structure of the proposed protocol is shown in Fig. 3 
that all mentioned changes are reported with more details.  
In  the  next  section,  the  security  and  the  privacy  of 
proposed protocol is analyzed and it is shown that how the 
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new  changes  remove  all  mentioned  weaknesses  on  the 
ILMAP protocol. 
5.  Analysis of Proposed Protocol 
In this section, in order to evaluate the security and the 
privacy of proposed protocol, some analysis are provided. 
Indeed,  we  investigate  the  proposed  protocol  against 
different attacks.   
5.1  Secret Parameters Reveal 
In section 3.1.1, we observed that how an attacker can use 
   to obtain   , and consequently how he/she can uses the 
obtained    to calculate    using          . But in the 
proposed  protocol  this  weaknesses  omitted  by  changing 
                 to                    . It can 
be seen that with new    the attacker can not obtain    and 
  . As a result, the proposed protocol is safe against secret 
parameters reveal attack.    
5.2  Replay Attack 
In the proposed protocol, due to applied some changes in 
the  exchanged  data  between  the  tag  and  the  reader 
including     and   ,  and  also  due  to  generate  two  new 
numbers (   and   ) in each session of the protocol,  the 
attacker cannot perform replay attack. 
5.3  Impersonation Attack 
In the proposed protocol, in order to perform impersonation 
attacks,  the  attacker  needs          and     to  calculate 
exchanged  messages  between  the  tag  and  the  reader 
including     ,    ,      and    ,  where  
                                   and          
  . In other side, since all mentioned secret parameters are 
protected, thus the attacker cannot impersonate the tag or 
the  reader.  As  a  result  the  proposed  protocol  is  secure 
against impersonation attacks. 
5.4  Reader forward secrecy 
In the proposed protocol, in order to remove this weakness 
we  changed                   to                 
         where                          
         . It can be seen that since the value of   varies 
in each run of protocol, even if the reader be compromised 
by the attacker, he/she will not be able to track previous 
communications. As a result, the proposed protocol is safe 
against reader forward secrecy compromise.  
5.5  Privacy 
In  section  3.2,  it  is  showed  that  the  privacy  of  ILMAP 
protocol  has  some  problems  that  makes  it  vulnerable 
against all traceability attacks. In the proposed protocol, in 
order  to  enhance  the  privacy  and  remove  all  mentioned 
privacy  attacks,  we  apply  two  changes  in  the  updating 
                         Database                                                        Reader                                        Tag 
  𝐾?𝑙? ??𝑙?, 𝑃?𝑙?, 𝐾??𝑤, ???𝑤, 𝑃 ??𝑤, 𝑅??, ?𝑃?, ?𝐴𝑇𝐴                                 𝑅??                                             𝐾𝑖 ?𝑖 𝑃𝑖 ?𝑃?𝑠  
𝑉??𝑖?𝑦    𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑖   𝐾𝑋    ?   𝐾𝑋    𝑃𝑅?? 𝑃𝑋    ?  
    
?𝑇   ?   𝐾𝑋 
?     𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑃?𝑠   ?𝑇    𝑃𝑋 
????   ?𝐴𝑇𝐴   𝑅?? 
?𝐴?   ? ?𝐴𝑇𝐴   ?𝑅  
?    ?𝑖   ?𝑋 
??  𝑋   ??𝑤 
?𝑙?? 
??? ?𝑎?  𝑅?? in DB 
    𝑉??𝑖?𝑦 ? 𝑅??   ?𝑅   ?    𝑉  
    
??  ???𝑤   ?    𝐾??𝑤 
      ???𝑤     
   𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑃?𝑠   ?𝑅   ?   𝐾??𝑤  
      𝑋   ??𝑤 
Else: 
      ??𝑙?   ?    𝐾?𝑙? 
      ??𝑙?     
   𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑃?𝑠   ?𝑅   ?   𝐾?𝑙?  
      𝑋   ?𝑙? 
End  
Then computes values below: 
     𝐾?𝑙?   𝐾??𝑤   𝑃𝑅?? 𝐾??𝑤   ?   
      𝑃?𝑙?   𝑃 ??𝑤   𝑃𝑅?? 𝑃 ??𝑤  
      ??𝑙?   ???𝑤   𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑇   ?𝑅   𝑃𝑋  
     ???𝑤   𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑇   ?𝑅   𝑃𝑋   
??? If  
 
 
?𝑅 → 
?    𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑃?𝑠   ?𝑅   ?𝑇    𝐾𝑖 
?   ?𝑇   𝐾𝑖 
?𝑖   ?𝑖   ?  
?   ?𝑇   𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑖   𝐾𝑖 
   𝑃𝑅?? 𝑃𝑖  
 
Generates random numbers ?𝑇 and ?   
 
   ?  ? ?𝑖 ?  
𝑉   ? 𝑅??   ?𝑅   ?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ?  ? ?𝑖 ? ?𝑅 𝑉    
 ?  ???? ?𝐴?  → 
 
?𝐴𝑇𝐴   ????   𝑅?? 
𝑉??𝑖?𝑦  ? ?𝐴𝑇𝐴   ?𝑅    ?𝐴?  
    
 
?  → 
 
𝑉??𝑖?𝑦 ?    𝑃𝑖    
   𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑃?𝑠   ?𝑇  
        𝐾𝑖     𝑃𝑅?? 𝐾𝑖   ?   
        𝑃𝑖     𝑃𝑅?? 𝑃𝑖  
        ?𝑖     𝑃𝑅?? ?𝑇   ?𝑅   𝑃𝑖  
 
Fig. 3. Improved version of ILMAP protocol. 
ACSIJ Advances in Computer Science: an International Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 5, No.11 , September 2014
ISSN : 2322-5157
www.ACSIJ.org
50
Copyright (c) 2014 Advances in Computer Science: an International Journal. All Rights Reserved. 
 
procedures.  First,  we  change  updating  of      
            to                     that  makes 
it  resistance  against  traceability  attack.  In  addition,  in 
order to prevent backward and forward traceability attacks, 
we exchange updating procedure of               with 
                , where    is a new random number 
that generated by the tag. It can be seen that with these 
changes,  the  attacker  cannot  threat  the  privacy  of  end-
users. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide user 
privacy and it is safe against different traceability attacks.  
Table 2 shows a comparison of the security and privacy 
analysis for proposed protocol and some similar protocols 
that  are  under  EPC  C1  G2  standard  and  have  been 
proposed recently. As it can be seen, the security and the 
privacy of the proposed protocol are complete and it can 
provide secure communications for RFID and IoT users.  
Table 2. Comparison of security analysis 
Protocols 
 
Attack 
Yeh et 
al [19] 
Habibi 
et al [8] 
ILMAP 
[23] 
Improved 
ILMAP  
Secret Values Reveal            
Replay         
Impersonation           
Reader Forward Secrecy           
Data Integrity            
Backward Traceability           
Traceability            
Forward Traceability          
: Secure     : Insecure 
6.  Conclusions 
In  this  study,  we  cryptanalyzed  a  mutual  authentication 
protocol for RFID systems that proposed by Mohammadi 
et al. in 2014. They  were claimed that their protocol is 
secure against various attacks. However we showed that 
their  protocol  has  some  weaknesses  that  makes  it 
vulnerable  against  secret  parameters  reveal,  tag 
impersonation, data desynchronization attacks and also it 
cannot  provide  user  privacy.  All  privacy  analysis 
presented  based  on  a  formal  RFID  privacy  model  that 
proposed by Ouafi and Phan. Moreover, we proposed an 
improved  version  of  Mohammadi  et  al.’s  protocol  that 
eliminates  all  existing  weaknesses.  Security  analysis 
illustrated  that  the  proposed  protocol  is  secure  against 
different attacks and it can provide secure and confidential 
communication for RFID users.  
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